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Starkie, in his work on Evidence, when dealing with indirect
proof, ventured the statement that, when facts are to be inferred
f ron other facts, the latter must "be established by direct evidence.
in the same manner, as if they were the very facts in issue." This
suggestion, says Wigmore,1 "has been repeated by a few courts, and
2
sometimes actually enforced," and he cites a decision from Illinois.
one from Indiana 2 and two from the Supreme Court of the United
States. 4 A later Indiana case repudiates the doctrine.5 Unfortunately the error has found its way into the decisions of this state,
and. as yet. there has been no .atteipt to extirpate it. It was seemingly for the first time propounded in Douglass v. Mitchell's Executor. 6 and it has been repeated in MeAleer v. McMurray, 7 Philadelphia City Passenger Railway Co. v. I-Tenriae,s Dettra v. Kestner9
and Welsh v. R. R. ° An examination of these cases will show that
Evidence, 112.
'Globe Accident Ins. Co. v. Gerish, 163 I1. 625.
'Binns v. State. 66 Ind. 428.
'IT. S. v. Ross. 92 U. S. 281: Manning v. Ins. Co., 100 U. S .693.
'Hinshaw v. State, 147 Ind. 334.
35 Pa. 440. See Warren v. Commonwealth, 37 Pa. 45, where it was
held improper to infer drunkenness from being out of work, and to infer
inability to deliberate, when committing a homicide, from this drunkenness.
'58 Pa. 126.
992 Pa. 431.
p147 Pa. 566.
30181 Pa. 461.
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although they were correctly decided, the principle invoked was
either not necessary, or was actually inapplicable to the decision.
An action was brought by Douglass against Mitchell's Executor, upon two promissory notes. The genuineness of the signature
of Thomas S. Mitchell to these notes was not contested. The body
of them was in the plaintiff's handwriting. The defence was that
plaintiff had become in some way possessed of pieces of paper having on them the name of Mitchell, wriftten by him, and had written
the promises to pay over it. The defendant offered to prove that
Mitchell, a lawyer and conveyancer, was a very methodical business
man; that he regularly deposited moneys received by him, and that
there were no deposits corresponding with the money alleged by
plaintiff to have been loaned on these notes; in order that the jury
might infer that the loans were not made. The defendant offered
also, to prove that six months after the dates of the notes, Mitchell
had passed for his client a conveyance to him of ground-rents, made
by Douglass, the plaintiff, to which Douglass' wife was not a party,
in order that the jury might infer that he did not then know that
Douglass was a married man; and from this ignorance, that he did
not know Douglass as well as he would have known him, had hE
twice borrowed money from him six months before. The trial
judge disparaged this evidence in his re'marks to the jury, and the
Supreme Court, affirming the judgment for the plaintiff, laid down
the principle: "Whenever circumstantial evidence is relied upon
to prove a fact, the circumstances must be proved, and not themselves presumed. * * * * A presumption which the jury is to draw
is not a circumstance in proof, and is therefore not itself a legitimate foundation for presumption." The first of the offers supra did
not involve the proof of a fact by another presumed fact. The fact
proved was that Mitchell invariably deposited moneys obtained by
him. immediately after obtaining them, and that he deposited no
moneys immediately after Dec. 1st. 1852, and Jan. 4th, 1853, the
dates of the notes. Neither of these was presumed. What was presumed. that is. inferred, was that no money was got by Mitchell or.
these dates. The fault with the evidence is not that it deduces fact
c from fact b. which, in turn. has been deduced from fact a, but
that it deduces fact c from two facts, a and b, both of which are
testimonially proved, but from which c cannot with any safety be
inferred.
The second of the offers is, apparently, a genuine instance of a
"presumption on a presumption." Mitchell's skill and fidelity
would prevent his permitting his client to accept a grant of ground-
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rent from a man, without joinder therein of his wife, if he knew
that the man had a wife; therefore, he did not know that he had
a wife; therefore, six months before, he did not know the man well
enough to accept a loan from him, or as well as he would have
known him, had he accepted such loan; therefore, he did not accept such loan. From (a) the skill and care, is inferred (b) the
ignorance of the fact of marriage; froi' this is inferred (c) the
prior ignorance of the man; and from this is inferred (d) the nonborrowing. Strong, J., himself suggests a reason for attaching but
little weight to such evidence other than the maxim concerning
presumption from a presumption. The failure of Mitchell to inquire whether the grantor of the ground-rent (Douglass,) was a
married man, rebutted the evidence that he was a careful conveyancer. The several inferences are also too feeble. From habitual
care, alone, can care on a particular occasion be safely inferred ,
Can A's ignorance of X's being married entirely satisfy that A is
so far ignorant of X. that he would not borrow, or has not borrowed, from him? The double presumption notion is unnecessary
to vindicate the decision.
Tn McAleer v. McMurray, case of deceit in inducing McAleer
to purchase shares of stock in an oil company. no direct evidence of
misrepresentations to him was offered. No misrepresentations
other than those in the certificate of organization were proved. The
plaintiff argued that (a) it must be presumed that he inspected the
certificate before buying the shares, and (b) that by what he thu:
saw. he was induced to buy them. Although Thompson, C. J., invokes the principle that one presumption cannot be built on another
he nevertheless shows that the real fault with the argument of the
plaintiff is. that neither the inference that he saw the certificate.
nor. that. seeing it. he would be induced by it to buy shares, could
be safely-drawn. "A much greater probability is that the plaintiff
purchased the oil stock, because such stocks were just then in grem,
demand."
A child sixteen months old having been run over by a car of
the defendant. in Philadelphia City Pass. Co. v. Ilenrice. fhe question was whether the driver had been guilty of negligence. It was
testified that he would have seen the child, as it approached the
tracks. if he had been looking. He testified that he did not see it,
his attention being diverted by a woman who was crossing the track
The plaintiff was permitted to prove the hours of service, per day
seventeen or eighteen. reauired of drivers and of this particular
driver, in order that the jurors might infer that this driver, on this
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occasion, was disabled from attentive sight, on account of excessivE
hours of waking, and therefore that the company was negligent in
putting its car in charge of a man in that condition. In reversing
the judgment for the plaintiff, Paxson, J., cites the principle thot
"the law permits inferences from other facts, but does not allow
presumptions of fact from presumptions. A fact being established
other facts may be and often are ascertained by just inferences.
Not so with a mere presumption of a fact; no presumption car
with safety be drawn from a presumption; there being no fixed
or ascertained fact from which an inference of fact might be drawn
none is drawn." The relevancy of these remarks is doubtful. The
offer was to show not merely that drivers generally were, but that
this particular driver was, required to work from 17 to 18 hour
per day. Only one inference of fact was to be drawn from this,
viz., that the driver would be incapable of proper attention. Paxson. J., assumes, however, that the evidence respected drivers generally , and not this driver. The inference then would be, (a) thai
this driver was treated like other drivers and hence, (b) worked
from 17 to 18 hours daily; and hence (c) was incapable of giving
proper attention. and the justice seems to admit that it was competent to prove that the driver was drunk, or for any other reason
incompetent to attend to his duties. The real objection to the verdict. then, seems to have been, that from the fact (a) that driver:generally were required to work 17 or 18 hours. the jury was allowed to infer that (b) the particular driver had been required to
work so long and from this to infer (c) that he was not able to be
as attenive and therefore was not as attentive, as one in his position. ought to be. Fact c would be inferred from fact (b) and fact
(b) from fact (a.) If there was any error in the trial, it consisted
probably in allowing the direct proof of the treatment of other
drivers. instead of direct proof of the treatment of the driver in
question. As. when the locomotive which emits sparks and causes
a fire. is known. the absence of fit spark-arresters from other locomo
tives is not a legitimate ground for inferring that this particulal
locomotive had no proper spark-arrester. so possibly, the enforcec
loss of sleep of other drivers might not be a legitimate means oJ.
provitg the loss of sleep- of the particular driver. It is doubtfu'
whether the error was conceived by the court to consist in deducing
a fact from a fact itself deduced, or in the deduction of this latter
fact.
Tn Welsh v. R. R. Co., a man was found dead within a track
near a crossing. The crossing gates were not operated at night, no!
the. flag; nor were there sufficient lamps. There was no evidencE
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that Welsh had attempted to cross the tracks, at the crossing, o
that if on the crossing he was there lawfully. He might have been
a loiterer; or have been walking along the track. It was necessary,
not only to show that the omission to maintain the flag, or to operate the gate at night, was negligent, but to show that it caused the
death. A presumption, said Dean, J., must be based on facts, not
on a presumption, but how the principle is applicable to the case
is unapparent. The question was, was Welsh attempting to cross
the track at the crossing when he was killed? The only fact from
which this could be inferred, was that he was found dead some short
distance from the crossing on the track. This fact was explicable
in several alternative ways.'
The above are the principal cases in Pennsylvania in which
the doctrine has been propounded of the non-presumableness of a
fact from another fact which itself has been attained by a presumption. Is this doctrine sound?
Prof. Wigmore, in his great work on Evidence, 2 declares.
"There is no such rule, nor can be." We infer fact b from fact a
because of the observed connection between such facts on other occasions, and of the uniformity of nature, seen or assumed by us.
If water has heretofore frozen at :32 degrees, we infer that on
a night when the thermometer indicated zero, water was frozen.
If fact b is invariably found connected with fact a, from either
we may infer the existence of the other. But, suppose, in addition,
that fact c is invariably associated with fact b. Can we not infer
b from a, and o from b? Let us suppose that in nine-tenths of the
cases in which a exists, it is accompanied by b, and that in ninetenths of the cases in which b exists it is accompanied by c. Then
in eighty-one one-hundredths of cases a will be accompanied by
both b and e. Proof of the existence of a would render probable
the existence of c, and as judicial investigations deal chieflv with
probabilities, it is legitimate to use fact a as a means of creating
the probability, or diminishing the improbability of fact b, and
therefore of fact c.
A week before B's death by gunshot A threatened to shoot
him. The threat may be proved. on the trial of A. We may more
or less strongly presume (a) that it expressed a real intention, (b)
that this intention would persist for a week. and (c) that one who
had the intention to shoot B probably did the shooting., The class
of those intending to kill B is a small one, and A is in it.
'Cf. Dettra v. Kestner, 147 Pa. 566, which it is not necessary to specifically consider.
Vol. 1, p. 112.
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When X is on trial for a crime of fraud he may prove his reputation for honesty? Why? It is presumed (a) from his reputation. that he has in fact been honest, and (b) if he has been in fact
honest, he probably would not commit the crime charged, a presumption on a presumption.
A is tried for the theft of a watch. It is proved that an hour
after the theft, he had the watch. From this the jury may infer
that he has had it ever since the taking; and from this that he did
the taking.
A crime has been committed and X flees from the neighborhood. From this fact (a) the jury may infer (b) the desire to escape arrest and punishment; from this (c) the consciousness of
having committed the crime, and from this (d) that X committed it.
A in Carlisle hands a letter addressed to B, at Boston, and
properly stamped, to a carrier. It will be presumed (a) that the
carrier delivered it at the office in Carlisle; (b) that some one
there put it in the proper bag or pouch; (c) that the pouch was
delivered to the common carrier; (b) that it reached the terminal
post-office; (e) that it was handed over to the proper carrier, (f)
that he delivered it to B, the addressee. None of these presumptions after (a) can operate without (a.)
The promissor of a note is found, after its maturity, in posse&
sion of it. From this is inferred (a) that he got it with the promisee's consent; (b) that the promisee would not have consented
without payment.
A points a gun at the abdomen of B, and pulls the trigger
and its contents enter B. He is tried for murder of the first degree.
It is presumed or inferred (a) that A was acquainted with the contents of the gun, and of the effect upon them of pulling the trigger:
(b) that he knew that the contents would enter the abdomen of B;
(c) that doing so they would probably kill; (d) that A intended
to kill.
A, tried for the murder of B, alleges that the death was an
accident. His wife, C, was the only other witness to the occurrence.
He neglects to call C to testify. It is argued, he would call C, it
he thought her testimony favorable; hence her testimony would not
be favorable, hence, B's death was not accidental.
A testifies as a witness, to fact p. The inference is, (a) he
would not so testify, unless he believed that p had happened; (b)
he would not believe that p had happened unless it actually did
happen.
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A is on trial for the murder of B. It is proved that B, two
days before, had committed adultery with A's wife, of which shortly
after, A was made aware. From-this, may be provisionally inferred
that A was enraged at B; from this, that he purposed to inflict
grave bodily harm on B; from this, that he committed the homicide.
A owns a house worth $4000, but has an insurance upon it for
$8000. The house has been burnt down. In the action on the policy
the fact that the worth of the house is less than the insurance moneYi
leads to the inferefnce (a) that he felt a desire to get the money;
and therefore (b) that he set fire to the building.
There can be no objection to a presumption, or inference, of
fact c from fact b, because fact b is itself inferred from fact a, unless the probability of o from a is too feeble to justify the submission of it to the jury. If a is invariably accompanied by b and b by
a, and c in ninety per cent of cases, accompanies b, o can be as safely inferred from a as from b. The witness testifying to a, the jury
could as warrantably infer c, through b as it could from b,
When the nexus between a and b is not invariable, as also that between b and c, there is, of course a smaller percentage of cases of
connection between a and c than between b and c, but this is no reason for rejecting an inference from a fact itself inferred, for there
may be and are cases in which the probability of c from a, through
their common connection with b, will be greater than in other cases
that of the connection of b with a or of c with b. Some presumptions directly from a proven fact are too faintly probable to justify
the submission of the fact, as a basis of inference to the jury, while
the inference, in other cases. of b from a And of c from b, and of 17
from c is sufficiently sure to justify that submission.
It is not to be wondered at. therefore. that so competent a
thinker and writer as Prof. Wigmore. denying that there is any
rule forbidding an inference upon an inference, remarks, "There
is no such rule: nor can be. If there were, hardly a single trial
could be adequately prosecuted. For example, on a charge of murder. the defendant's gun is found discharged; from this we infer
that he discharged it; and from this we infer that it was his bullet which struck and killed the deceased. Or, the defendant is
shown to have been sharpening a knife; from this we argue that
he had a design to use it upon the deceased, and from this we argue that the fatal stab was the result of this design. In these and
innumerable daily instances we build up inference upon inference.
and yet no court ever thought of forbidding it. All departments of
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reasoning, all scientific work, every day's life and every day's trials,
proceed upon such data. The judicial uLterances that sanction the
fallacious and impracticable limitation, originally put forward

without authority, 1 must be taken as valid only for the particular
evidentiary facts therein ruled upon.1 2
WILLI.AM TicETT.

MOOT COUIRT
HENDRICKS vs. P. R. R. Co.

Personal

Injury-Parents'

Responsibility-Contributory

Negligence.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Hendricks, the father of an infant of the age of five years, knowingly
and negligently permits said infant to play near a railroad crossing, where
the cars frequently and habitually pass. While so playing the child is ruh
over and severely injured by a passing train, no one at the time being near,
or exercising any personal supervision over it. The child exercised all
the care that could reasonably be expected of one so young, but not such
care as would have been required of a person of mature years and discreNevertheless, the railroad company was
tion under the circumstances.
guilty of negligence; and had its agents exercised due care and vigilance,
the accident could have been avoided. The infant, by his next friend, brings
action against the railroad company for injuries sustained.
Clark and Robertson for plaintiff.
A father cannot recover for an Injury to his son of tender age caused
in part by his own imprudence, though the child may by his next friend.
Glossey vs. Railroad, 57 Pa. 172.
A child i- not to be judged by the same rule as an adult and cannot
Ransch vs. Floyd, 31
be regarded as guilty of contributory negligen6e.
Pa. 358.
Hicks and Smith for the defendant.
If an infant insists upon a right om action, he must show a compliance with conditions on which his right is to avail. Hadfield vs. -Roper
21 Wend. 615.
Railroads have a right to presumi that infants will not be in the
vicinity of their tracks. Presence of infants on or near railroads means
culpable negligence on the part of parents.. P. & R. R. R. Co. vs, Hammel,
44 Pa. 375.
1By Starkie.
2

Wigmore, Evidence 112.
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OPINION 'OF THE COURT.
SORBER, J.:-The facts of this case are as follows: Hendricks, the
father of an infant child of the age of five years, knowingly and negligently permits said infant to play near a railroad crossing, where the cars frequently and habitually pass. While so playing the child is run over and
severely injured, no one at the time being near, or exercising any personal
supervision over it. The child exercised all the care that could reasonably
be expected of one so young, but not such care as would have been required of a person of mature years and discretion under the circumstances.
Nevertheless, the railroad company is guilty of negligence and had its
agents exercised due care and vigilance, the accident could have been
avoided. The infant, by its next friend, brings an action against the railroad company for injuries sustained.
We have here contributory negligence on the part of the pareat. We
have also negligence on the part of the defendant through its agent or
agents. Negligence cannot be imputed to the child owing to its tendei
age. Can the infant through its next friend recover damages for the inJury?
An early Penna. Case, Kay v. Pa. IL. R. Co., 65 Pa. 269, involving facts
similar to those of this case holds that there can be a recovery. In that
case an action was brought by the child through its next friend to recover
damages for an injury to the infant. The child was placed by its mother
in front of a chair ,and in the absence of the mother, went upon the tracks
The facts
of the defendant company and was thus severely injured.
showed that the railroad company was guilty of negligence. Chief justlce
Agnew, in his opinion, said, "Persons who use their property so as to hold
forth an invitation to others to use it, give a license to do so. * * * Toleration is not to be overlooked in testing a man's right to the use of his
property. In the present case the railroad company built its tracks along
the canal basin and left its lot open for the convenient use of the puAblic.
As a consequence people passed and repassed upon the tracks. The presumption of a clear track at this place could not reasonably arise, if the
circumstances were such as have been stated. A greater precaution against
injury to those thus permittcd to use the lot and the tracks becomes a
duty."
In regard to the defendant company's negligence, Justice Agnew says
"When the injury is caused by the actual negligence of the company, the
incapacity of the child to know and avoid the danger, shields it from re.
sponsibility for its acts. The doctrine which imputes the negligence of
the parent to the child in such a case as this Is repulsive to our natural
instincts."
It has been held that a defendant company is liable for injuries sustained by the child, where the child has been sent by the parent on an er.
rand which necessarily took the child on the tracks of the company. P. A.
& M. Co. v. Pearson, 13 Pa. 412.
In the case of the North Pa. R. R. Co., v. Mahoney, 57 Pa. 187, a child
of tender years for the purpose of protection was taken Into the arms of
a person, to whose care she had been intrusted, and by the negligence of
distinctly held, that such
such person was Injured by an engine . It
negligence was not contributory negligence so as to discharge the rail-
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road company , their servants having been also negligent. The same doe.
trine is explicitly laid down in Pittsburg, Allegheny and Manchester Passenger R. R. Co. v. Caldwell, 74 Pa. 421, and in Lockhart et al. v. Lichtenthaler
et al., 46 Pa. 151.
It is unnecessary to produce additional authority that the negligence
of the parent cannot be imputed to the child, and that the defendant alone
is guilty of culpable negligence.
Where a railroad company has for many years, without objection, per.
mitted the public to cross its tracks at a certain point, not in. itself a public crossing, it owes the duty of reasonable care toward those using the
crossing, and whether such reasonable care has been exercised or not, is
ordinarily a question for the jury under all the evidence. Taylor v. Del .&
Hudson Coal Co., 119 Pa. 327. The same case holds that a! child eight
years old will not be held to be guilty of negligence. In the present case
the accident occurred at a public crr,ssinig, and the child was only five years
old.
In view of the uniform and very numerous decisions in Pennsylvania
upon the law applicable to this case, we are of opinion that the plaintiff is
entitled to damages and direct judgment accordingly.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The action is by the boy who suffered the injury. He was five years
old when the accident occurred. He was incapable of contributory negligence. Hestonville R. R. Co. v. Kelley, 102 Pa. 115; 13 P. & L. Dig.
21681. The defendant was guilty of negligently causing the injury. Why
should it not make compensation?
That the parents were negligent, would prevent their recovery for the
injury of the child, but they are not suing. The father is upon the record
only as the child's next friend. The child owns his own body; subject to
the parents' power over it until its emancipation. Why should the negligence of the parent deprive it of the right to obtain compensation from
the defendant for the injury to itself? The child, suing by its next friend,
may recover. Kay v. P. R. R. Co., 65 Pa. 269; 13 P. & L. Dig. 21706.
Judgment affirmed.

DOWN EY'S ESTATE.

Subscription to Charity-Consideration-Effect of Death of Promisor-Act
of April 26, 1855, Section 11 Construed.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
John Downey, a member of the M. E. Church, advised the erection of
a new church, and solicited subscriptions for it, himself subscribing $500.
Before his subscription, subscriptions to the amount of $2500 had been obtained. Following his name on the list were 22 persons whose aggregate
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subscriptions were $2400. Downey's subscription was written in the book,
(a paper) on December 7th.
On January 7 following he was suddenly killed in a railroad accident.
The church now claims payment in the distribution of the estate, in
the Orphan's Court.
Hicks for the claimant.
A moral obligation is a sufficient consideration to support an express
promise.
Chambers v. Calhoun, 18 Pa. 13.
Edinboro Academy v. Robinson, 37 Pa. 210.
Hart's Estate, W. N. C. 162.
Helfenstein's Estate, 77 Pa. 328.
The mutual promises of subscribers constitute a valid consideration.
Hart's Estate, 7 W. N. C. 162.
Edinboro Academy v. Robinson, 37 Pa. 210.
The promise is irrevocable after acceptance.
Kelfenstein's Estate, 77 Pa. 328.
The fact that a contract is to be performed in part or whole after the
death of the promisor does not render it incapable of enforcement.
Pierson's Estate, 6 D. R. 23.
Arnold for the respondent.
OPINION

OF THE COURT.

LABAR, J.:-The subscription of Downey to pay $500 was prima facie
gratuitous, and unless there is some consideration shown by the evidence
the church cannot be allowed to share in the distribution of his estate.
In some jurislictions voluntary subscriptions to charities have been
sustained on the ground that the promise of each subscriber is the consideration for the promise of the others. Clark on Contracts, p. 167.
In Pierson's Estate, 6 Dist. 23, it was decided that where a subscription to a charity ismade with the express purpose and understanding that
such paper was to be shown to third persons as an inducement for subshown, and presumptively accomplished such
scriptions, and it was so
purpose, a consideration is shown such as the law requires, to sustain a
contract.
While Downey advised the erection of a new church and solicited subscriptions for it, we are of the opinion that this alone is not sufficient to
prove that others were induced to subscribe by reason of his subscription.
His subscription was not placed at the beginning of the list nor does It
appear that it was expresslv shown to others as an inducement for them
to subscribe. Lippincott's Estate, 21 Super. 214.
The general rule is that a gratuitous subscription cannot be enforced
unless the promissee has, in reliance on the promise on the faith of
thing, or incurred, or assumed some liability or obligation on the faith of
the promise. Clark on Contracts, p. 167; Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, Vol.
27, pp. 280 & 285; Wharton on Contracts Sec. 528; Cottage Street church
vs. Kendall, 121 Mass. 528. Baptist Church vs. Cornwell, 117 N. Y. 601.
It does not appear that any church has been erected, or contract made,
or obligation Incurred on the faith of the subscriptions, or that the subscriptions have been accepted by the church; therefore the subscription
of Downey was a mere offer and revoked by his death. Ryers vs. Presbyterian Congregation, 33 Pa. 114; Reimensnyder, Admr. vs. Gans, 110 Pa.
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17; Helfenstein's Estate, 77 Pa. 328; Stokes Estate, 9 W. N. C. 439;
Phipps vs. Jones, 20 Pa. 260.
We are of opinion that the statement of facts does not show a legal
consideration for the claim and it is accordingly disallowed.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
Downey's subscription was made on Dec. 7th, and he died on the following Jan. 7th. Was the subscription "at least one calendar month before" his death, in the sense of the 11th section of the act of April 26th,
1855? It would not have heen had the death occurred Jan. 6th; Carnell's
Estate, 9 Phila. 322; Socks' Estate, 15 Super. 281. It was decided in
Simpson's Estate, 37 Pitts Leg. Jour. 492, that a codicil executed Feb. 2d,
1889, by a testator who died March 2d, 1889, was void; that Is, that the
death must occur not earlier than the day in the month succeeding
the execution of the will, which follows the day on which the will was
executed. This view Is rejected by Penrose, J., in Wittman's Estate, 9 Dist.
47, and also, apparently in Sock's Estate, 15 Super. 281. If at noon, Dec.
7th, the subscription was written, it would have been at least a calendar
month before a death -occurring at 3 o'clock P. M. of Jan. 7th. But, In Wlttman's Estate, the hours at which the execution of the will and the death
occurred, are not given. Should they be considered? We think they should.
We are not able to conclude, as does that very able Judge, Penrose, that
"there is no special weight to be given to the words "at least." Without
these words, it might have been plausibly held that the hours of the day
would be ignored, so that if A executed a will just before midnight of Dec.
7 and died just after midnight, between Jan. 6th and Jan. 7th, he would be
considered as having executed it one calendar month before his death, although he in fact executed it only 30 days and three or four minutes before
his death. The use of the words "at least" indicates a purpose to require
a full calendar month between the two events. Eldred's Estate, 5 Forum
208. The statute makes void all charitable dispositions of property "except the same be done * * * at least one calendar month," etc. We think
the claimant under such a disposition must as much prove the Interval of
a calendar month, as the execution of the deed or will. The burden Is upo,
him. There ought to have been evidence as to the time of day at which the
subscription and the subscriber's death occurred. The evidence given does
not show that "at least one calendar nronth" intervened. In order to exempt
the subscription from the annulling power of the statute, it must therefore,
be made to appear that it was "for a fair and valuable consideration."
Reimensnyder's Adm. v. Gans, 110 Pa. 17.
But the subscription was not testamentary, and cannot operate as a will,
Nor, was It a conveyance. It was a mere promise to pay, and as such, both
In virtue of and independently of the act of 1855, it would need a consideration. What Is the consideration? Before he subscribed, others had subscribed. Those previous subscriptions were evidently not the consideration
for Downey's. It does not appear that he induced them by promising to
subscribe. There were twenty-two later subscriptions. But, it does not appear that they were procured by Downey's promise to allow his to stand.
There Is no evidence even, that any one of these would have been withheld.
had Downey's name not been on the list. Those who preceded him, subscribed without expectation that he would subscribe, and those who fol-
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lowed him may equally well be believed to have subscribed without reference to his.
Had it appeared even, that the later subscribers were Influenced by the
discovery of his signature to the paper it would have to be said that they
nevertheless knew that it was gratuitous, and therefore revocable, and also
voidable by his death within a calendar month. Reimensnyder's Adm. v.
Gans, 110 Pa. 17. If th~e later subscribers subscribed on the condition that
Downey's subscription should be enforcable, theirs were for the same reasons which made his non-enforceable, likewise non-enforceable.
It is held apparently, in Pierson's Estate, 6 Dist. 23, that If the church
even after the subscriber's death, within a calendar month, made contracts,
or expended money, in. reliance on the subscription, It would, by that ace,
furnish a consideration. This we think, an inadmissible view. If when the
subscription or promise was made, and when the subscriber died, there was
no consideration, it would not be competent for the promisee to furnish the
consideration after his death and thus convert the promise from a gratuitous Into a binding one. Prior to the furnishing of a consideration, the promise was merely an offer, which, by his death, was withdrawn, and could not be
effectually accepted subsequently. Helfenstein's Estate, 77 Pa. 328; Phipps
v. Jones, 20 Pa. 260.
The learned court below has well said that no sort of consideration
appears in the case; no expenditure, no incurring of liabilities by the
church, no subscriptions in reliance on Downey's. It does not even appear
that the church in any way accepted the subscription. until after his death.
Surely up to that time it and all the other subscriptions were revocable.
Cf. Lippincott's Estate, 21 Super. 214.
Appeal dismissed.

MILLS vs. CRACKER CO.

Pure Food Laws--Sale
ages-Effect

of Goods for Food-Warranty-Measure

of

Dam-

of Dissolution of Corporation-Act of June 26, 1895.

Construed-Act of May 4, 1889, Construed.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Mills, who runs a grocery store in the city of Philadelphia, was asked by
the authorized agent of the Cracker Compa-iy, to purchase certain chocolate cakes. Mills said, "Will these things stand the pure food test?" The
agent answered, "All the goods that we make will stand the test." Mills
then ordered some of the cakes, which were in due time sent to him. Some
time afterwards the Pure Food Commissioner of the State of Pennsylvania
came along, bought a few of the cakes, and after having them analyzed, Instituted a prosecution against Mills under the pure food laws of Pennsylvania. Mills was convicted, fined $50 and the costs of prosecution. The
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State Chemist testified that the cakes were made partly of roof paint and
yellow clay, which was most likely true. This got into the newspapers the
next day, and in consequence Mills' business was hurt very greatly. Mills
now wishes to bring an action in trespass against the Cracker company
for the sum of $10,000, as the false representation caused him to handle
the cakes, and in consequence he was arrested and his business injured.
He also wishes to recover the amount of the fine he was compelled to pay,
and the costs. The cracker company in the meantime has sold out to another concern.
Showalter for the plaintiff.
A corporation Is liable for the torts of Its agent acting within the powers of the corporation and within the scope of his agency. Clark vs. City
of Washington, 12 Wheaton 40; Turnpike Co. vs. Rutter, 4 S. & R. 6; Butler vs. Watkins, 13 Wallace 456; Erie City Iron Works vs. Barber & Co.,
106 Pa 125.
Exemplary damages may be awarded against a corporation where
they would be awarded against an Individual if acting for himself. R. R.
Co. vs. Quigley, 21 Howard 202; Hart vs. R. R. Co., 10 L. R. A. 794.
McAlee for the defendant.
The law will consider only proximate causes, for the reason that remote or speculative considerations would not afford a sufficient degree
of certainty for judicial action. Am. & Eng. Eacy. of Law, Vol. 8, p. 517.
Fairbanks vs. Kerr and Smith, 70 Pa. 86.
The damages must be such as naturally flow from the breach, and
such as the parties may fairly be supposed to have contemplated. Smith
vs. Western Union Telegraph Co., 83 Ky. 104.
OPINION OF THE, COURT.
BOWMAN, J.:-At the time Mills, the plaintiff, purchased the cakes,
he asked the agent of the cracker company the question, "Will these things
stand the pure food test?" The agent answered, "All the goods that we
make will stand the test." An analysis of the cakes purchased disclosed
the fact that the cakes were made partly of roof paint land yellow clay, and
did not stand the pure food test.
Was the answer of the agent such an evasive one, or such a false representation or suppression of the truth that his principal will be bound
in this action? We believe it was. The principal knew what the ingredients of these cakes were, but the purchaser did not. The agent's authority
was to sell these cakes as chocolate cakes. In doing so his principal impliedly authorized him to make such statements to purchasers as would
lead to contracts or sales. He was equipped with authority from his principal to sell cakes made partly of roof paint and yellow clay as chocolate
cakes. There is abundant evidence of the fact that the cracker company
had full knowledge of the false representations necessary to lead to sales
of these calies. The agent was not instructed to sell "roof paint and yellow
clay" cakes. Can there be clearer fraud than the manufacture of cakes
of roof paint and yellow clay and the sale of them as chocolate cakes? The
court said in Freyer vs. McCord, 165 Pa. 539, "In order to maintain the
action the proof of fraud must be clear, and there must be some evidence
of participation or knowledge on the part of the principal, or circumstances
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sufficient to impute knowledge." See also Keefe vs. Sholl, 181 Pa. 90.
As to the sufficiency of circumstances it was said in Providence Steam
Engine Co. vs. Lochiel Iron Co., 2 Pears. 178, "It is pretty difficult to appoint
an agent to sell, and the principal not to be affected by what he says in
making the sale; it is supposed to enter into the contract. This is generally the case unless where the purchaser knows that the agent's power is
limited. Although it may be that such an agent cannot make a warranty,
yet If the representations led to the contract and were untrue, the party to
whom they were made might not be bound by the contract." So held In
Griswold vs. Gebbie, 126 Pa. 353.
In the case before us there is evidence of circumstances sufficient to
impute knowledge on the part of the principal. The agent's power was
not limited. The purchaser bought without knowledge of the fraud.
Fraudulent representations by a vendor may be as well by acts or arti
flces calculated to deceive, as by positive assertions. Croyle vs. Moses, 90
Pa. 250; Boyd vs. Browne, 6 Pa. 310; Cornelius vs. Molloy, 7 Pa. 293.
We have no hesitancy in saying that fraud was used in this sale, that it
is imputable to the principal and that the principal is liable in this action.
The damages must be compensatory; not speculative nor vindicatory.
Erie City Iron Works vs. Barber & Co., 102 Pa. 156; Hexter vs. Bast, 125 Pa.
52. Pennsylvania R. R. Co. vs. Books, 57 Pa. 339.
What amount of damages is compensatory in this case? The plaintiff
asks for $10,000. Has he shown that he has suffered that amount? We
think not. He has lost the difference between the amount he paid for the
cakes and the amount he realized from the sale of the same. This he is
entitled to. He has also suffered the loss of the fine of $50 imposed on him
In the action against him under the pure food laws, and the costs in that
action. We believe these damages are proximate and that he may recover
same. All damages beyond this are too remote. His loss of trade is not
the direct result of the sale of these cakes by the defendant, but is occasloned by newspaper notoriety. This he cannot recover.
One more consideration- Against whom should this action have been
brought? The cracker company has sold out to another concern. We dc
not know whether or not its corporate existence has ceased. It is neces
sary, therefore, to consider an alternative hypothesis.
If the corporation has not been dissolved judgment Is entered against
it for the difference between the amount paid by the plaintiff for the cakes
and the amount he realized from the sale of the same, fifty dollars, being
the amount of the fine paid by him in the action under the pure food laws,
and the costs in that action
If the corporation has been dissolved, the plaintiff is non-suited.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.
It does not appear that the agent of the defendant knew that the chocolate cakes contained the adulterants which they( did contain. It would
not be possible to hold him liable for deceit. Had it appeared that the
Company had fasely instructed him as to the purity of the cakes, in order
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that he might, though without fraud on his part, deceive buyers the Com.
pany would be guilty of deceit. It did not appear that he was instructed to
make this representation. No deceit can be found.
Was there a warranty? When A sells goods which are to be eaten by
human beings, to B, a retail dealer, there is no implied warranty that they
are wholesome and fit for food. 15 Am. & Eng. Encyc. 1237.
Was there an express warranty? It is not necessary -that the vendor
should use the word warrant in order to make a warranty. If the vendee.
to his knowledge, buys solely because he relies on a representation made
by him concerning the quality of the thing, he may be understood to warrant that the thing possesses this quality. 30 Am. & Eng. Encyc. 137. Mills
before agreeing to buy the chocolate cakes, indicated his desire to know
whether he could safely sell them In view of the pure food legislation of
of the state. "Will these things," he asks "stand the pure food test?" The
agent replied In the affirmative. In order to stand the pure food test, the
article had to be free from any mixture that would lower or Injuriously affect its quality or strength; any mixture of any Inferior or cheaper substance. Act June 26th-1895. The agent in substance averred that the
chocolate cakes were free from such mixture. We think his words may
properly be understood to be a warranty of purity.
Was the agent authorized to give such a warranty? or rather was Mills
justified in believing, and did he believe that the agent had this authority?
and is the defendant to be held chargeable with this belief? The agent
was sent out to make sales of the chocolate cakes.
He did not carry
them with him, nor if he had would every small grocer or other buyer have been able to make an analysis of them before purchasing them. No
grocer could be expected to buy in the teeth of the law, without -some
assurafice respecting the purity of the article offered him. He would be
justified In thinking that the vendor had authorized the agent to make
the representations and give the warranty. The vendor should have forseen that such would be the inference of those who dealt with the agent.
We think therefore, that the warranty given by the agent must be treated
as that of his principal. Cf. Huffcut, Agency, p. 110.
The act of May 4th 1889, provides that "in every sale of green,
salted, pickled or smokod meats, lard, or other articles of merchandise
used wholly or in part for food, said goods or merchandise shall correspond in kind and quality with the description given, either orally or in
writing by the vendor, and in every sale of such goods or merchandise,
unless the parties shall agree otherwise, there shall be an Implied contract
or undertaking that the goods or merchandise are sound and fit for
household consumption." The words "articles of merchandise," "goods or
merchandise" would probably be wide enough to embrace chocolate
cakes. Cf. Satterfield v. Hayes, 12 Dist. 723, where melons were held to
be embraced. The description under which the chocolate cakes were sold
was, that they would stand the pure food test; that Is, were free from
adulterations, and there was an implied, if not an express contract, that
the cakes were sound and fit for household consumption.
The warranty having been broken, what damages should the plaintiff recover? The cakes were bought, as the agent of the defendant knew,
In order to be sold. The law Imposed stringent penalties upon the sale
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of adulterated foods. The warranty was given with reference to these
penalties. We do not think the arrest, conviction and punishment of the
plaintiff so remote a result of the sale to him of the article, that the defendant should not be liable to make compensation.
The connection between the arrest and conviction of the plaintiff
and the shrinkage of his business is not shown with any precision. The
sbrinkage, if any, was due to the action of other voluntary agencies. The
conviction did not establish any guilty or fraudulent intention on the part
of the plaintiff, and if the truth had been circulated about him, the public
would have known that he had been imposed upon as any other grocer
might have been without fault.
Judgment affirmed.

WILLIAM HALLOWAY vs. JONAS SHEPHARD.

Ballrment-Fixtures-

Right of Removal-When Replevin Will Lie.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Shephard leased a lot of ground with a mill on it to Adam Keller. Halloway leased to Keller a boiler. The contract required Halloway to set It
up, and Keller to pay a $100 rental quarterly. When $2000 should be paid
it stipulated that the boiler should become the property of Keller. Shephard was aware of the contract. Keller paid eight installments ofl $100
each, but then became insolvent, vacated the premises, leaving the boiler
in the mill. Halloway, after an installment on the boiler became overdue
one month, demanded permission to take the boiler away. The contract
stipulated that he might do so upon ten days' default in paying an installment. Shephard declined to allow Halloway to remove the boiler. He also
declined to say that he would make the payments remaining. Plaintiff
brings this action of replevit for the boiler.
LaBar for the plaintiff.
Trade fixtures erected by a tenant are personal property and can be
removed by him or recovered in an action of replevin. Hill vs. Sewald,
53 Pa. 271; Radey vs. McCurdy, 209 Pa. 306; Watts vs. Lehman, 107 Pa.
110.
Reed for the defendant.
A boiler when set up in a mill becomes a fixture and hence part of
the realty. Tiedeman on Real Property, p. 6.
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A tenant loses his right to remove fixtures by surrendering his
term. Davis vs. Moss 38 Pa., 346; Thropp's Appeal, 70 Pa. 395.
A writ of replevin is effectual for a delivery of personal property only.
Roberts vs. Dauphin Bank, 19 Pa. 71.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
SMITH, R. E., J.:-The general doctrine is that trade fixtures are personalty and therefore removable and the intention of annexation may well
be considered to determine the character of the articles as realty or personalty. Siegin v. Pettitt, 77 Pa. 437; Carver v. Rough, 153 Pa. 225. The
doctrine of the U. S. Supreme Court as set forth in Wiggins Ferry Co. v
Ohio R. Co., 142 U. S. 396, is, that it Is difficult to conceive that any fixture however solid, permanent and closely attached to realty placed there
for the mere purpose of trade may not be removed at the end of the term.
That a tenant may remove from devised premises, fixtures erected by him
thereon for the benefit of his trade or business, if tne removal be be made during the term, after the term they become part of the realty and are not severable, is the doctrine as set forth in Hey v. Brunner, 61 Pa. 87.
Engines and boilers have been held to be trade fixtures and pass as
personalty in Hey v. Brunner, 61 Pa. 87; Davis v. Moss,* 38 Pa. 346; Leman
v. Mill, 4 Watts 330, but in another line of cases they have been considered
part of the realty-Roberts v. Dauphin Deposit Bank, 19 Pa. 71; Vail v.
Weaver, 132 Pa. 363. The rule seems to be that they are realty so as to
pass under a conveyance but personalty in view of the intention wtlh which
they were annexed or the mode of annexation.
The question as to whether the contract was one of bailment or conditional sale seems to have friends on both sides. The prevailing opinion
however, seems to favor considering it as constituting a conditional sale.
The rule in Pennsylvania seems to be that if the vendee has the option, it is
termed a bailment; if h has contracted to buy, it is a sale and the third
party acquires good title.
In the American and English Encyclopedia of Law, Vol. 24, page 491
and In Ferguson v. Fanterstein, 160 Pa. 429, the rule Is laid down, that
where in cases of conditional sales of chattels, the vendor has become entitled to the possession of the property by reason of non-performance of
conditions, the action of replevin will be to enforce such rights either
against the vendee or person claiming under the vendee. Before there has
been a default in the condition of the sale so as to entitle the vendor to possession, he, of course cannot recover possession by replevin.
The question now arises whether the vacation of the premises, which
occurred previous to the default of payments of an installment could be
considcred as bringing the term to an end. In Prin. v. Carr, 9 Pa. 326, and In
the American and English Encyclopedia of Law, Vol. 18, page 364, the
rule Is made that when the tenant on the vacation of the premises has
openly and unmistakably manifested a desire and Intention to put an end
to the lease, if possible, the acceptance of the surrender may be more readIly Inferred than when the tenant has left in doubt of. his intention to return.
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We are inclined to believe in the case at bar, that although the boiler
may be replevined as a trade fixture, yet its possession by Shephard, the
lessor, before the right to rescind the contract accrued to Halloway, was
justifiable and the boiler became a part of the realty. Hence an. action in
replevin would not lie, and a verdict must be found in favor of the defendant.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
Halloway "leased" to Keller the boiler, who was to pay a "rental."
When $2000 should have been paid, the boiler was to become Keller's. This
contract was a ballment and a conditional contract of sale. The boiler was
Halloway's until $2000 were paid.
Not only was it Halloway's, as against Keller. It was Halloway's as
against creditors of Keller, with or without notice. If Shephard could be
considered a creditor, Halloway's title would be good against him.
Besides, he had full notice of thb character of the relation between Halloway
and Keller.
But, Shephard is not claiming as a creditor. He has levied no execution
on the boiler, nor has he distrained upon it for rent in arrear. It does not
appear that there is any rent in arrear. Shephard's claim is founded on
the hypothesis that the boiler was by the act of Halloway and the tenant
provisionally incorporated into the land, and that, by the vacation of the
premises, this provisional has become a definitive incorporation.
There are several objections to this view. It does not appear what
physical connection there was between the boiler and the land. It was, we
may presume, "set up," but precisely what that process was, we cannot
know.
Personal- property brought on leased premises, does not, ipso facto, become a part of them. The lessee stations his wagons, and horses, on them,
They have not become a part of them. Not enough appears to justify the
inference that the "boiler" became in any sense, a "fixture."
If a "fixture" at all, it was a trade-fixture, and was removable at the
end of the term. It does not appear that the term has ended, either normally or by forfeiture or surrender. To "'vacate the premises" is not to
surrender them. There has then, been no final incorporation of the boiler
into the land. It was the right of Keller to take it away, unless distrained
upon, or levied upon under a ft. fa. The right of Halloway was at least
equal to that of Keller.
A demand was made on Shephard by Halloway for permission to remove the boiler, and it was refused. Halloway then acquired the right tc
bring the action of replevin in order to obtain possession of it, or damages
for its conversion.
Judgment reversed with v. .f d. n.
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ADAM COOVER vs. JOHN LITTLE.

Ejectment-Widow's Election-Words

of Inheritance In Will.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
John Stake, by will directed his debts to be paid and "after one third
of the residue of my property is taken by my wife, I give the rest and residue (of my property) to my children, John and Joseph." The widow received from year to year the interest at six per cent on one-third of the
value of the property, both real and personal from John and Joseph for
seventeen years when she died devising all her property to Adam Coover
The latter alleging that she had an undivided one-third in the land of Stake,
brought this ejectment against the tenant of John and Joseph.
Keenan for the plaintiff.
Her interest vests co instante, on the death of her husband. Thomas vs.
Simpson, 3 Pa. 60.
An election in pais to take under a will, should be clear and positive.
Dickinson's Estate, 61 Pa. 401.
Roush for the defendant.
The widow might have taken under the will or she might have elected
to take her dower. Gallagher's Estate, 76 Pa. 296.
After her death her choice cannot be changed by either her heirs or her
personal representations. Jackson's Appeal, 126 Pa. 105.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
LINDLEY. J.:-This case may be disposed of with few words. Accord.
Ing to the Act of 1848, the widow might have elected to take under the provisions of the will,or if she preferred, have elected to take her dower rights
as though her husband had died intestate-taking one-third of the personalty
absolutely and a one-third interest for life in the realty.
She preferred to accept her husband's bounty as provided in his
will, as Is evidenced by the fact that she did not elect to take her dower
nor did she apparently express any dissatisfaction with the terms of thewill during the seventeen years in which she continued to live after her
husband's death.
What did the widow take under the will of John Stake? Did she take
more than a life estate? He "by will directed his debts to be paid and aftei
one-third of the residue of my property is taken by my wife, I give the rest
and residue to my children John and Joseph." The testator certainly did
not give expression to the fact that he intended she should have only a life
estate in his property, for she was entitled by law to one-third of the personalty absolutely. But the word "property" includes both personalty and
realty. Therefore, we conclude that he intended the devise to her to be
absolute.
Even before the Act of 1833, the blending of the real and personAl es
tate would have carried a fee simple. The act provides that, "all devises
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of real estate shall pass the whole estate of the testator in the premises devised, although there be no words of Inheritance or of perpetuity, unless
it appear by a devise over or by words of limitation, or otherwise in the
will, that the testator Intended to devise a less estate."
The will of John Stake contains no devise over, nor do we find any express limitation of the estate to his wife for life only.
None of fthe clauses of the will are repugnant to each other, and in
construing the will as devising a fee simple to the widow, there is entire
harmony with its other provisions and there is thus carried out the evident
intentions of the testator. Snyder vs. Baer, 144 Pa. 278; Williams vs.
Leech, 28 Pa. 89; Biddle's Appeal 69 Pa. 190; White vs. Com. 110 Pa. 90.
Judgment for plaintiff.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The testator directs the payment of his debts. This involves a subtraction from his estate, and the leaving of a residue. This residue was
composed of land and probably personalty. What is to become of this residue? Evidently, one third of it is to be taken by his wife. "After one-third
of the residue of my property is taken by my wife" is his expression. She
no more takes one-third of the land when she takes a life estate in onethird of it, than she would take one-third of the personalty, by taking one
third of it for life. The gift to John and Joseph was of the rest and residue,
after one-third had been taken by the wife. Clearly the widow, John and
Joseph are made equal tenants In common.
The fact that John and Joseph took possession of all the estate, paying six per cent. of the value of her third annually, to the widow is not decisive that she or th6y regarded her as owning only a life estate. But If
they did, the fact would be of little significance. It could not interpret the
intention of the testator, of which the will only, is the authentic expression.
It could not lessen from a fee to a life estate, what had been given to the
widow by the husband.
It follows that, at the widow's death, her devisee is entitled to her onethird.
Judgment affirmed.

PETER SUNDERLAND vs. SAMUEL NORCROSS.

Damages for Breach of Contract-Offer and Acceptance-Notice of Revoca.
tion.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
The defendant meeting the plaintiff on the street May 1, offered to sell'
him a certain.cow for $40.00, the offer to remain open for one week. May
2, the defendant received from one Jones a letter- offering $45.00 for- the
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cow. The defendant sent a letter to the plaintiff at once revoking his offer
of May 1, and while posting his letter, told one Matthews of the letter he
was sending to revoke the offer. Matthews at once telegraphed these facts
to the plaintiff, who thereupon telegraphed defendant an acceptance of the
offer of May 1, before he received the defendant's letter of revocation. The
defendant refused to deliver the cow to the plaintiff and the plaintiff sues
him for breach of contract.
Thompson for the plaintIff.

When an offer is made and accepted by the posting of a letter of acceptance before notice of withdrawal is received the contract is not Impaired
by the fact that a revocation had been mailed before the Jetter of accept
ance. Patrick v. Bowman, 149 U. S. 411.
As soon as an answer of acceptance by the other party is put in the
mail the contract is completely closed as to both parties even though a
letter containing a retraction of the offer is actually on the way. The retraction takes place when it is received. Anderson on Contracts, p. 43.
Cohen for the defendant.
A revocation need not be communicated to the offeree by the offeror, it
Is sufficient if he have knowledge of the offeror's intention to revoke, no
mater how he gets that knowledge. Clark on Contracts, pp. 49 and 50.
In the case of an offer to sell specific property actual knowledge to another to revoke would clearly show such intention. Dickinson vs. Dodds,
Mew's English cases, Law Digest, Vol. 4, col. 10.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
ROUSH, J.:-It is a firmly established principle of law that an unaccepted offer, though coupled with a promise to keep it open for acceptance
for a certain Lime, may never the less be revoked before the time has expired, if the promise is with out a consideration. Hamilton v. Lycoming
Ins. Co., 5 Pa. 339; Coleman v. Applegarth, 68 Md. 21; Clark on Contracts,
p. 46. It follows from this principle, that the defendant had the right ta
revoke his offer at any time before acceptance by the plaintiff.
The moment of the communication of a revocation is the moment of it!
receipt; and the moment of the communication of an acceptance, is the m
ment of its dispatch. Hamilton v. Lycoming Ins. Co., 5 Pa. 339. But this
rule is not'absolute and seems to have a well defined exception, which was
clearly laid down in Dickinson V. Dodds, 2 Ch. Div. 463. (Am. & Eng. Encyc.
Vol. 7, p. 128.) The facts and the law in that case were briefly as follows:
A offered in writing to sell certain houses to B, adding a statement that
the offer was to be left open until a time named. B made up his mind the
next morning to accept, but delayed communicating his acceptance to A
in the course of the day he heard from a person who was acting as his agent
In the matter, that A had meanwhile offered or agreed to sell the property
to C. Early in the following day (and within the time limited by A's memrrandum) B sought out A, and handed a formal acceptance to him; but A
answered: "You are too late. I have sold the property." It was held that
the proposer's changed intention, however it reaches the other party, will
make the proposer's conduct a sufficient revocation.
Now in the case at bar, it appears that the plaintiff, before sending the
Dy
acceptance, had knowledge, through one Matthews, that the defendant,
decision
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offer,
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that that. knowledge precludes the plaintiff from a recovery. Had the plain
tiff sent his acceptance, without knowledge of the revocation (no matter
how obtained) there can be no doubt but that the plaintiff could recover. In
Coleman v. Applegarth, 68 Md. 21, which is a case affirming Dickinson v.
Dodds, supra, the court said that a mere offer to hold open, without consider.
ation, only continued until it should be withdrawn, or otherwise ended by
some act of his, but he was entirely at liberty at any time, before accept,
ance to withdraw the offer; and the subsequent sale and transfer of the
property to a third person, had the effect of at once terminating the offei
to the plaintiff.
While there are no direct authorities In Pennsylvania, on this point, the
two cases just cited, Dickinson v. Dodds and Coleman v. Applegarth, seem
to be based so firmly upon just principles and reason, that we feel bound tc
follow their lead. For these reasons we are of the opinion that the plaintiff
cannot recover and judgment must be given for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.
The offer was made May 1st., to sell the cow for $40 within one week.
Getting a better price the next day, Norcross sent a letter at once to Sunderland, revoking the offer. He had the right to revoke it then. A revocation
however does not occur, when the purpose to revoke is formed, nor when
the letter, telegram, message, expressing it Is dispatched, but only when it is
received by the offeree. Before this revocation by letter was received, Sunderland had informed Norcross, by telegram, that the offer was accepted.
Were there nothing more, the contract would have been completed by the
receipt of this telegram. The subsequent arrival of the epistolary information would have had no effect upon it.
But besides the letter with its revocation, something else occurred. The
intention not to abide by the offer was communicated by Norcross to Matthews, who at once telegraphed the fact to Sunderland. His acceptance was
despatched after, and in consequence of, the receipt of the telegram, after in.
formation, therefore, that Norcross did not intend to honor any acceptance
by him. Could he then accept?
The offer was the expression of his intention. It imposed no duty on Norcross to continue in the same mind until acceptance. Had the change of
mind not been notified to Sunderland, he -would have been justified In as
suming that none had occurred, and in concluding, when he accepted, that
both himself and Norcross had entered into contractual obligations toward
each other. He was not justified in doing this, when he had information of
Norcross' change of purpose. So much is intimated In Dickinson v. Dodds
2 Ch. Div. 463; Wald's Pollock on Contracts, 32; McCauley v. Coe, 150 Ill.
311; Coleman v. Applegarth, 68 Md. 21; Cf. Brauer v. Shaw, 169 Mass. 19S,
where Holmes, J., Intimates that knowledge of a revocation, though not for
mally notified to the offeree will preclude a subsequent acceptance.
Judgment affirmed.
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BOOK REVIEW
Wald's Pollock on Contracts; 3d Edition by Samuel Williston. Baker, Voorhis & Co., N. Y., 1906.
Frederick Pollock's place in contemporary legal literature is so unique,
and so well appreciated by the profession that observation upon it would be
wholly superfluous. His mastery of the history of English law is perhaps
unmatched and his power of philosophical analyses of legal conceptions Is
unusual. The addition by Dean Wald to the earlier American edition was
very valuable. Of Prof. Williston, editor of this the 3d edition encomium
would be unnecessay. His erudition is known to the whole legal world.
He has contributed to this edition 150pages embracing valuable discussions
of contracts for the benefit of third persons in the United States, repudiation
of contracts, and discharge of contracts. The notes are very full and extensive. We note as specially valuable the discussion of revocation of offer, p. 27,
and of contracts by correspondence, p. 35. Perhaps the best extant treat
ment of consideration, Is that which Is found at p. 185, a chapter which It
is a delight to read. A very interesting and no less important part of the"
treatise, is that devoted to unlawful agreements, p. 370, the exposition of
which is ample (it covers 150 pages) and admirably lucid. The subtitle restraint of trade is at this time, of particular interest, and the table of English
cases upon this subject, found at p. 478, with the elements of their decisions
Is extremely convenient. The important topic of mistake, is treated in over
80 pages. Many men of ability have presented to the public works on the
very comprehensive and important subject of contracts, Parsons, Anson, Harriman, Hare. Metcalfe, and many more. It can be said that few equal Williston's Wald's P61lock in fullness of discussion, and that in careful analysis,
lucid and exact definition and philosophical development of doctrine, It is
probably without a peer.

